Journal
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 65, Issue 4, Pages 845-862Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axt022
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I defend a causal reductionist account of the nature of rates of change like velocity and acceleration. This account identifies velocity with the past derivative of position and acceleration with the future derivative of velocity. Unlike most reductionist accounts, it can preserve the role of velocity as a cause of future positions and acceleration as the effect of current forces. I show that this is possible only if all the fundamental laws are expressed by differential equations of the same order. Consideration of the continuity of time explains why the differential equations are all second order. This explanation is not available on non-causal or non-reductionist accounts of rates of change. Finally, I argue that alleged counterexamples to the reductionist account involving physically impossible worlds are irrelevant to an analysis of the properties that play a causal role in the actual world.
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