Journal
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 64, Issue 2, Pages 255-277Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axs026
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The question as to whether there are mathematical explanations of physical phenomena has recently received a great deal of attention in the literature. The answer is potentially relevant for the ontology of mathematics; if affirmative, it would support a new version of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism. In this article, I first review critically a few examples of such explanations and advance a general analysis of the desiderata to be satisfied by them. Second, in an attempt to strengthen the realist position, I propose a new type of example, drawing on probabilistic considerations.
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