Journal
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Volume 77, Issue 1, Pages 372-414Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00575.x
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We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time-and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programmes were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modelled as a special instance of our more general model, dynamically efficient kidney exchange mechanisms are derived as corollaries. We make policy recommendations using simulations.
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