Journal
DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS
Volume 22, Issue 1, Pages 43-61Publisher
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.491668
Keywords
Secrecy and deception; Truthful disclosure; Homeland security; Resource allocation; Game theory
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In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and how a first mover should disclose her resource allocation. Our model allows us to explore whether the first mover should disclose correct information about her resource allocation, incorrect information, or no information. Although we study secrecy and deception specifically in the homeland-security context where the first mover is assumed to be the defender, our work can also provide insights in other contexts, such as business competition.
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