Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
Volume 109, Issue -, Pages 120-134Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.11.009
Keywords
Public goods; Heterogeneity; Privileged groups; Inequality; Cooperation; Punishment
Categories
Funding
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [FOR 1371]
- European Research Council [ERC-Adg 295707]
- Network of Integrated Behavioural Science (NIBS) - ESRC [ES/K002201/1]
- ESRC [ES/K002201/1] Funding Source: UKRI
- Economic and Social Research Council [ES/K002201/1] Funding Source: researchfish
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We experimentally investigate the effects of two different sources of heterogeneity - capability and valuation - on the provision of public goods when punishment is possible or not. We find that compared to homogeneous groups, asymmetric valuations for the public good have negative effects on cooperation and its enforcement through informal sanctions. Asymmetric capabilities in providing the public good, in contrast, have a positive and stabilizing effect on voluntary contributions. The main reason for these results is the different externalities contributions have on the other group members' payoffs affecting individuals' willingness to cooperate. We thus provide evidence that it is not the asymmetric nature of groups per se that facilitates or impedes collective action, but that it is rather the nature of asymmetry that determines the degree of cooperation and the level of public good provision. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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