Journal
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
Volume 103, Issue -, Pages 338-344Publisher
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.06.045
Keywords
Carbon trading; Game theory; The Shapley value; Initial allocation
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Funding
- Bayer-Tongji Chair for Sustainable Development
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Carbon emission trading is an effective measure to reduce greenhouse as emissions worldwide. China has publicized plans to initiate the demonstration of carbon emission trading in seven regions as of 2013. Initial allocation is fundamental, but it proposes difficulty in the mechanism design of the carbon emission trading system. Benchmark, grandfathering and the Shapley value have been employed to simulate a specific case, which consists of the initial allocation of carbon emission allowances of three power plants in Shanghai, China. The results of the Shapley value are regarded as a theoretical equitable reference. The results of benchmark are similar to those of the Shapley value. However, it is apparent that the allocation regarding grandfathering is inequitable. Considering other factors, we proposed the following: At the introduction of experimental stage, free allocation pertaining to grandfathering can be adopted; meanwhile, benchmark should be prepared and adopted at the appropriate time. Furthermore, a portion of the initial allowances can be reserved for auction, and this portion for auction will escalate to the extent of 100% upon entering the formal stage. In addition, the tiered price mechanism and the subsidy policy are also suggested. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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