The closed-loop supply chain network with competition and design for remanufactureability

In this paper, a two-period closed-loop supply chain network is investigated, with manufacturers as decentralized decision makers who compete for market share. In the first period, each manufacturer decides on the production quantity and level of remanufactureability, which has impact on the cost of both new and remanufactured products. In period two, manufacturers can manufacture and/or remanufacture products, taking into account that consumers have different valuations of new and remanufactured products. We derive the optimality conditions and establish that the governing equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality problem. Through a series of case studies, we answer several important research questions, such as the impact of remanufactureability design and the consumers' perception of the remanufactured product on profitability and market share. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.