Journal
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 110, Issue -, Pages 273-294Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002
Keywords
Evolution; Nash program; Logit choice; Egalitarianism
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Funding
- Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea
- National Research Foundation of Korea [NRF-2016S1A3A2924944]
- Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [ECS-699613]
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When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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