Journal
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Volume 28, Issue 5, Pages 503-509Publisher
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0963721419855658
Keywords
dual-process theory; reasoning; decision making; bias
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Funding
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche [ANR-16-CE28-0010-01]
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Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.
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