4.2 Article

Point shaving in NCAA Men's Basketball: Behavioral finance, scale, and deterrence

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DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100670

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Behavioral economics and finance; Financial market corruption; Financial market regulation; Sports betting; Match fixing; Point shaving

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The study found that intentional point-shaving behavior is more common among senior players in NCAA Men's Basketball, and the lack of deterrence leverage is an important factor in players' decision-making process. Additionally, properties of a potential behavioral finance policy to deter point-shaving were analyzed.
We examine point-shaving corruption in NCAA Men's Basketball betting markets, which has persisted despite deterrence policies. We collect data on players indicted or implicated for point-shaving within the last 50 years and find that: (1) the act is significantly more common among senior, or final year, players and (2) lack of deterrence leverage is an important factor in the representative player's decision calculus. Lastly, we analyze properties of a potential behavioral finance policy to further deter point-shaving, whereby players receive a grant (athletic scholarship) that retroactively converts into a market-rate student loan given malfeasance. The policy's deterrence properties are examined theoretically. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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