Journal
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Volume 82, Issue 1, Pages 127-138Publisher
MIT PRESS
DOI: 10.1162/003465300558560
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This paper seeks to identify the characteristics that make individual U.S. banks more likely to fail or be acquired. We use bank-specific information to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We use alternative measures of productive efficiency to proxy management quality, and find that inefficiency increases the risk of failure while reducing the probability of a bank's being acquired. Finally, we show that the closer to insolvency a bank is (as reflected by a low equity-to-assets ratio) the more likely is its acquisition.
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