4.3 Article Proceedings Paper

Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers

Journal

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 44, Issue 4-6, Pages 667-681

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00057-X

Keywords

efficient auctions; liquidity constraints

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We exhibit an efficient auction - an auction for which the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation - subject to the constraint that buyers may be budget- or liquidity-constrained. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D82.

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