The rotten institution: corruption in natural resource management

Despite widespread evidence of bribery and illegal exchange in natural resource management, corruption is largely unexplored and unincorporated in theorizations and descriptions of the political economy of environment/society interactions. This paper offers the outlines of a theory of natural resource corruption, defining it as a special case of extra-legal resource management institutions, exploring the challenge corruption poses for sustainable use of natural systems, and providing an example of corruption in the case of forest management in India. I argue here that corruption is an institutionalized system of nature/society interaction forged from state authority and molded around local social power through systems of social capital formation. I further suggest that corruption though unsustainable, is not environmentally destructive in a general sense, but that it instead puts selective pressure on some elements of a natural system while bypassing others. The argument addresses not only the character of corruption but also the role of institutions in mediating the relationships between the state and civil society, mon generally, (C) 2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.