Journal
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION
Volume 144, Issue 4, Pages 1246-1253Publisher
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.biocon.2010.10.028
Keywords
Game theory; Adaptive management; Stag hunt; Tragedy of the commons; Games against nature; Common-pool resource management; Multi-national cooperation; Conservation management; Resource management; Prisoners' dilemma
Funding
- NSF [DEB-0553768]
- University of California, Santa Barbara
- State of California
- Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis
- Commonwealth Environment Research Facilities Research Hub: Applied Environmental Decision Analysis
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Conservation problems typically involve groups with competing objectives and strategies. Taking effective conservation action requires identifying dependencies between competing strategies and determining which action optimally achieves the appropriate conservation goals given those dependencies. We show how several real-world conservation problems can be modeled game-theoretically. Three types of problems drive our analysis: multi-national conservation cooperation, management of common-pool resources, and games against nature. By revealing the underlying structure of these and other problems, game-theoretic models suggest potential solutions that are often invisible to the usual management protocol: decision followed by monitoring, feedback and revised decisions. The kind of adaptive management provided by the game-theoretic approach therefore complements existing adaptive management methodologies. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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