Journal
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Volume 37, Issue 2, Pages 104-117Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1006/jesp.2000.1436
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Based on the values-as-truisms hypothesis (Maio & Olson, 1998), two experiments tested whether the salience of reasons for a value increases provalue behavior over and above the effect of making the value salient. In the first experiment, we predicted and found that participants who contemplated their reasons regarding the value of equality subsequently behaved in a more egalitarian manner in a minimal group paradigm than participants whose value of equality was primed. In the second experiment, participants who contemplated their reasons regarding the value of helpfulness subsequently behaved in a more helpful manner than participants who had rated their positive feelings about the value. Overall, these results support a novel explanation for the value-behavior discrepancies that have been revealed in classic research (e.g., Darley & Batson, 1973). (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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