Journal
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
Volume 35, Issue 1, Pages -Publisher
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X11000914
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The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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