Journal
COGNITION
Volume 83, Issue 1, Pages 81-112Publisher
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DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(01)00168-8
Keywords
probability judgment; hierarchical structure; associative learning; frequency format; conjunction fallacy
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Why are people's judgments incoherent under probability formats? Research in an associative learning paradigm suggests that after structured learning participants give judgments based on predictiveness rather than normative probability. This is because people's learning mechanisms attune to statistical contingencies in the environment, and they use these learned associations as a basis for subsequent probability judgments. We introduced a hierarchical structure into a simulated medical diagnosis task, setting up a conflict between predictiveness and coherence. Thus, a target symptom was more predictive of a subordinate disease than of its superordinate category, even though the latter included the former. Under a probability format participants tended to violate coherence and make ratings in line with predictiveness; under a frequency format they were more normative. These results are difficult to explain within a unitary model of inference, whether associative or frequency-based. In the light of this, and other findings in the judgment and learning literature, a dual-component model is proposed. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All fights reserved.
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