Journal
ECONOMIC THEORY
Volume 19, Issue 2, Pages 355-378Publisher
SPRINGER-VERLAG
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004217
Keywords
population ethics; rational choice; bargaining
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We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level principles in a general choice-theoretic model.
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