A partial cooperation model for non-unique linear two-level decision problems

This paper examines a linear static Stackelberg game where the follower's optimal reaction is not unique. Traditionally, the problem has been approached using either an optimistic or a pessimistic framework, respectively, representing the two extreme situations of full cooperation and zero cooperation from the follower. However, partial cooperation from the follower is a viable option. For partial cooperation, the leader's optimal strategy may be neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Introducing a cooperation index to describe the degree of follower cooperation, we first formulate a partial cooperation model for the leader. The two-level problem is then reformulated into a single-level model. It is shown that the optimistic and pessimistic situations are special cases of the general model, and that the leader's optimal choice may be an intermediate solution. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.