Journal
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 92, Issue 4, Pages 850-873Publisher
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/00028280260344498
Keywords
-
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are rational cheaters, who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the rational cheater model by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the rational cheater model predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available