Journal
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 70, Issue 5, Pages 1472-1483Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/377423
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Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such examples need to be handled with care given a) the differences between works of art and scientific theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and, moreover, allow us to understand how impossible artistic objects and inconsistent scientific theories can be said to represent.
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