Journal
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
Volume 47, Issue 2, Pages 207-231Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001
Keywords
energy policy; political economy; corruption; lobbying; industrialized countries; industry size; collective action
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We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers' and capital owners' lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982-1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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