Journal
MIND & LANGUAGE
Volume 19, Issue 2, Pages 147-176Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00252.x
Keywords
-
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Prominent evolutionary psychologists have argued that our innate psychological endowment consists of numerous domain-specific cognitive resources, rather than a few domain-general ones. In the light of some conceptual clarification, we examine the central in-principle arguments that evolutionary psychologists mount against domain-general cognition. We conclude (a) that the fundamental logic of Darwinism, as advanced within evolutionary psychology, does not entail that the innate mind consists exclusively, or even massively, of domain-specific features, and (b) that a mixed innate cognitive economy of domain-specific and domain-general resources remains a genuine conceptual possibility. However, an examination of evolutionary psychology's 'grain problem' reveals that there is no way of establishing a principled and robust distinction between domain-specific and domain-general features. Nevertheless, we show that evolutionary psychologists can and do live with this grain problem without their whole enterprise being undermined.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available