Journal
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Volume 48, Issue 3, Pages 356-378Publisher
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704264143
Keywords
public goods; partner selection; experimental economics
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The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.
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