Journal
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 48, Issue 3, Pages 697-713Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00316-1
Keywords
bargaining; endogenous timing; uncertainty
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Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size. Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus-as in the Nash demand game-or remain silent and wait until the surplus was observed. Adding the strategy to wait results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small. If commitments concern only who makes the first offer, the more balanced Nash bargaining solution is approximately restored. In all cases, commitment occurs in equilibrium - despite the risk of breakdown of negotiations. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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