Journal
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE
Volume 58, Issue 2, Pages 75-85Publisher
CANADIAN PSYCHOL ASSOC
DOI: 10.1037/h0085798
Keywords
-
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
In this paper, we re-examine a classic informal reasoning fallacy, the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam. We argue that the structure of some versions of this argument parallels examples of inductive reasoning that are widely viewed as unproblematic. Viewed probabilistically, these versions of the argument from ignorance constitute a legitimate form of reasoning; the textbook examples are inductive arguments that are not unsound but simply weak, due to the nature of the premises and conclusions involved. In an experiment, we demonstrated some of the variables affecting the strength of the argument, and conclude with some general considerations towards an empirical theory of argument strength.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available