Journal
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Volume 88, Issue 7-8, Pages 1625-1644Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5
Keywords
cooperation; framing; public good; social approval; social norms
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Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates how two important channels for social and internalized norms, social approval and framing, affect cooperation among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects. Firstly, it reveals each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. Secondly, it presents the public good game in a language that suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation. The first treatment effect increases voluntary contributions significantly. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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