Journal
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Volume 25, Issue 6, Pages 725-741Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2003.06.004
Keywords
consumer behavior; willingness-to-pay; auction
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We compare the capability of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism and the Vickrey auction to reveal willingness-to-pay information for a sample of French consumers. We measure the bias and dispersion of bids relative to valuations. We find that the Vickrey auction, for the particular training procedure we employ, is more effective as a willingness-to-pay elicitation device than the BDM process. We conjecture that differences in the shape of the payoff function account for some of the differences. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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