Journal
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Volume 87, Issue 1, Pages 15-27Publisher
BLACKWELL PUBLISHERS
DOI: 10.1111/j.0002-9092.2005.00698.x
Keywords
food safety; imperfect information; moral hazard; sampling inspection; supply chain
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Buyers have imperfect information about the food safety efforts exerted by suppliers. To gather information about safety, buyers often employ sampling inspection. Sampling inspection exhibits sampling error so some unsafe product passes inspection and some safe product does not. This uncertainty influences buyer and supplier behavior. In this article, I use a principal- agent model to examine how sampling inspection policies influence food safety. I use the model to examine the sampling inspection policies in the 1996 Pathogen Reduction/ Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point Act. I conclude that the regulation of sampling inspection procedures is an effective tool for policy makers who wish to improve food safety.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available