Journal
EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL B
Volume 44, Issue 1, Pages 129-135Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5
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We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation ( C) or defection ( D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics.
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