4.6 Article

Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection

Journal

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
Volume 76, Issue 2, Pages 369-399

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.003

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We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. Using a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries over the period 1980 to 2001, we find that the government relinquishes control over time to the benefit of local institutions, individuals, and foreign investors, and that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. Firm size, growth, and industry affiliation, privatization method, as well as the level of institutional development and investor protection, explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. The positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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