Journal
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Volume 272, Issue 1568, Pages 1115-1120Publisher
ROYAL SOCIETY
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2004.2988
Keywords
game theory; evolution; cooperation; reciprocal altruism; tit-for-tat
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The evolution of cooperation by direct reciprocity requires that individuals recognize their present partner and remember the outcome of their last encounter with that specific partner. Direct reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrate that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities. It is sufficient for an individual to base their decision of whether or not to cooperate on the outcome of their last encounter-even if it was with a different partner.
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