Journal
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Volume 89, Issue 8, Pages 1421-1435Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011
Keywords
public goods; collective action; punishment
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In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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