Journal
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
Volume 39, Issue 3, Pages 487-507Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.04.004
Keywords
stockholder litigation; earnings disclosures; endogeneity
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Securities litigation poses large costs to firms. The risk of litigation is heightened when firms have unexpectedly large earnings disappointments. Previous literature presents mixed evidence on whether voluntary disclosure of the bad news prior to scheduled earnings announcements deters or triggers litigation. We show that the counterintuitive finding in prior literature that disclosure triggers litigation could be driven by the endogeneity between disclosure and litigation. Using a simultaneous equations methodology, we find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. In fact, consistent with economic arguments, our evidence suggests that disclosure potentially deters certain types of litigation. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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