Journal
AUTOMATICA
Volume 41, Issue 10, Pages 1737-1749Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2005.05.004
Keywords
environment; joint implementation; differential games
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This paper proposes a two-player, finite-horizon differential game model to analyze joint implementation in environmental projects, one of the flexible mechanisms considered in the Kyoto Protocol. Our results show that allowing for foreign investments could in some cases increase the welfares of both parties involved in the project. Further, imposing an environmental target constraint does not necessarily deteriorate the payoffs of both players. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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