Journal
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
Volume 55, Issue 2, Pages 251-261Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.11.013
Keywords
nonmarket valuation; contest theory; environmental conflict
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Nonmarket valuation remains a central issue in ecological and environmental economics. This paper examines the properties of an ex post revealed preference approach to value nonmarket goods-valuation through observed effort expended in an environmental conflict. We consider the strategic interaction between players in a conflict, address the implied Nash equilibrium, and report a benchmark 4x-rule as an ex post valuation estimate for a symmetric player conflict. We then illustrate the degree of bias that exists once one allows for asymmetries in delegation, ability, and valuation. The benchmark tends to overestimate value if a firm hires a powerful delegate who receives a large contingency fee. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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