Journal
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Volume 34, Issue 3, Pages 576-595Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.08.009
Keywords
Latin America; Bolivia; Guatemala; decentralization; incentives; forestry
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The success of efforts to decentralize governance responsibilities hinges upon the incentives of local politicians. We test this argument by studying the experiences of forestry sector decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala. We analyze the survey responses of 200 mayors and show that local-level institutional incentives are systematically linked to variations in local politicians' interest and investment decisions in the forestry sector. Further, we find that a decentralization policy that transfers very limited decision-making powers to local governments stifles local interest in organizing resource governance activities. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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