Journal
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Volume 187, Issue 1, Pages 137-158Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6
Keywords
Port security; Cargo screening; Game theory; Deterrence; Decision analysis; Smuggling of weapons
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Funding
- Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) under Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of University [2007-ST-061-000001]
- University of Wisconsin-Madison Center for World Affairs
- Global Economy (WAGE)
- University of Wisconsin-Madison
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In this paper, we investigate how many containers would need to be screened in order to deter attackers from attempting to smuggle weapons into a defending country in container freight. We hypothesize that with a sufficiently high probability of being detected, attackers might be deterred from smuggling attempts. Thus, our goal is to identify the optimal proportion of containers to inspect in order to minimize the defender's expected loss, using game theory to reflect the fact that attackers are simultaneously trying to maximize their expected rewards. Moreover, our model recognizes that the container-screening policy must simultaneously protect against different types of threats (such as nuclear bombs, dirty bombs, and assault rifles). Finally, our model also suggests that threatening to retaliate against attacks may be beneficial to defenders, as long as the threat is credible.
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