Journal
JOURNAL OF STATISTICAL MECHANICS-THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Volume -, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
IOP PUBLISHING LTD
DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2006/06/P06013
Keywords
game-theory (theory); applications to game theory and mathematical economics; interacting agent models
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We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May (1992 Nature 359 826), in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score U-min, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got U-msn), also take into account if Umsn is above or below the threshold Umin. If U-msn < U-min an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modi. cation allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a 'win-stay, lose-shift' criterion. The cluster structure is analysed, and for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.
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