Journal
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 96, Issue 5, Pages 1611-1630Publisher
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.5.1611
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We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principal-agent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principal's controlling decision. Overall, the effect of control on the principal's payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy.
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