4.1 Article

Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments

Journal

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 58, Issue 2, Pages 269-292

Publisher

ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.002

Keywords

imitation; learning; local interaction; heterogeneity of environment; experiments; prisoners' dilemma

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In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones-regardless whether interaction neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both structures. We find that with some interaction neighbourhoods even the opposite may hold. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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