Journal
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
Volume 244, Issue 3, Pages 518-531Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018
Keywords
indirect reciprocity; reputation; norms; discriminator; exhaustive search; replicator dynamics
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Reputation formation is a key to understanding indirect reciprocity. In particular, the way to assign reputation to each individual, namely a norm that describes who is good and who is bad, greatly affects the possibility of sustained cooperation in the population. Previously, we have exhaustively studied reputation dynamics that are able to maintain a high level of cooperation at the ESS. However, this analysis examined the stability of monomorphic population and did not investigate polymorphic population where several strategies coexist. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of multiple behavioral strategies by replicator dynamics. We exhaustively study all 16 possible norms under which the reputation of a player in the next round is determined by the action of the self and the reputation of the opponent. For each norm, we explore evolutionary dynamics of three strategies: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. We find that only three norms, simple-standing, Kandori, and shunning, can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. The other 13 norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors. Also, we study the model in which private reputation errors exist to a small extent. In this case, we find the stable coexistence of unconditional and conditional cooperators under the three norms. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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