Journal
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volume 177, Issue 2, Pages 1113-1133Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2005.12.022
Keywords
location; terror; game theory
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We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes 'loss'). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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