Journal
SCIENCE
Volume 316, Issue 5833, Pages 1905-1907Publisher
AMER ASSOC ADVANCEMENT SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1126/science.1141588
Keywords
-
Categories
Funding
- NIGMS NIH HHS [R01 GM078986-01, R01GM078986, R01 GM078986] Funding Source: Medline
Ask authors/readers for more resources
In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooperative behavior are stable-once established, they prevent dissident minorities from spreading. But how can such costly punishing behavior gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors. Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available