Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MODERN PHYSICS C
Volume 18, Issue 7, Pages 1173-1185Publisher
WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD
DOI: 10.1142/S0129183107011212
Keywords
social dilemmas; complex networks; evolutionary games; cooperation
Ask authors/readers for more resources
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations where the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available