Journal
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY
Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 563-587Publisher
BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00320.x
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Funding
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences [0829326] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) manner, the optimal allocation of resources can be non-monotonic in the value of the attacker's outside option, and the defender prefers her defensive allocation to be public rather than secret.
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