Journal
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
Volume 16, Issue 3, Pages 583-599Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.002
Keywords
subjectivity; pre-reflectivity; consciousness; self-recognition; neural correlates; sensori-motor integration; self-related processes; phenomenology; cognitive neurosciences
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In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness can be of relevance for empirical research. In particular, I propose to interpret processes of sensorimotor integration in light of the phenomenological approach that allows the definition of pre-reflective self-consciousness. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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