Journal
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Volume 158, Issue 1, Pages 183-188Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0240-y
Keywords
centralized multi-agent inventory cost situations; inventory games; coalitional manipulation; SOC-rule
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In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483-491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (Share the Ordering Cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property.
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