Journal
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 62, Issue 2, Pages 329-347Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.002
Keywords
preference aggregation; incomplete preferences; Extended Pareto Rule
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We approach the problem of preference aggregation by endowing both individuals and coalitions with partially-ordered or incomplete preferences for decision under risk. Restricting attention to the case of complete individual preferences, and assuming complete preferences for some pairs of agents (interpersonal comparisons of utility units), we discover that the Extended Pareto Rule (if two disjoint coalitions A and B prefer x to y, then so does the coalition A boolean OR B) imposes a no arbitrage condition in the terms of utility comparison between agents. Furthermore, if all the individuals and pairs have complete preferences and certain non-degeneracy conditions are met, then we witness the emergence of a complete preference ordering for coalitions of all sizes. The corresponding utilities are a weighted sum of individual utilities, with the n - 1 independent weights obtained from the preferences of n - 1 pairs forming a spanning tree in the group. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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