Journal
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 27, Issue 1-2, Pages 17-27Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9033-4
Keywords
conventions; common knowledge; game theory
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Funding
- Economic and Social Research Council [RES-538-28-1001] Funding Source: researchfish
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Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis's approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein's Email Game suggests that coordinated action is no less hard for rational players without a common knowledge requirement. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the current paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives.
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